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COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

W. DANIEL ENGLISH,

)
)
Plaintiff/Respondent, )

vs.
STANDARD OPTICAL CO.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant/Appellant.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR
REHEARING

)

PRIORITY NO. 16

)
)

Case No. 900422-CA

)

APPEAL FROM THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY

Respondent W. Daniel English ("English") hereby files
this Response to Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Utah
Rules of Appellant Procedure, and as instructed by the Court
Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals by letter dated July 23, 1991.
Appellant Standard Optical Company ("Standard") seeks a rehearing
of the Opinion filed in the above-captioned matter by the Utah
Court of Appeals on June 25, 1991 on the grounds that the Court
misapprehended

or

overlooked

two

of

Standard's

arguments.

Because the Court did not misapprehend or overlook Standard's
arguments, a rehearing of this matter is not warranted and would
-1-

constitute a waste of the Court's and the parties7 time and
resources.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD WAS GIVEN CONSIDERATION FOR ITS AGREEMENT TO FAY
RENT.
Standard argues that the Court misapprehended Stan-

dard's argument that English never gave any consideration in
exchange for Standard's promise to pay rent after September 1,
1988.
Brief

It is clear from Standard's Brief of Appellant, Reply
of Appellant and Petition

for Rehearing

equates consideration with actual possession.

that Standard

Standard repeat-

edly argues that it was deprived of possession by English and
that as a result it was not given any consideration for its
agreement to pay rent.
Contrary to Standard's assertion, it is Standard who
misapprehends the law on consideration.

It is well established

that consideration is an act or a promise bargained for and given
in exchange for a promise.

Resource Management Co. v. Weston

Ranch and Livestock Co. , 706 P.2d 1028, L036 (Utah 1985).

The

definition given to the concept of consideration by the Utah
Supreme Court requires only bargained for promises.

It is not

necessary for a promisee to fulfill a promise in order for there
to

be

consideration;

the

promise
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itself

is

sufficient

consideration to form a contract.

See Bank of Wallowa County v.

Gary Mac, Inc. , 619 1= .2d 1310, 1314 (Or. App. 1980).
There

is no question

exchanged promises.
dences

English's

i11 this case that the

parties

The August 10, 1982, Lease Agreement evi-

promise

to

leased premises for a terr;
three year period wh i '•"'• •-

give

Standard

possession

of

the

* ten years, which term included the
t issue

Accord i in) In

the terms of the Lease Agreement, t h e parties promised:
That in consideration of t h e payments
hereinafter reserved to b e paid by t h e Lessee
to t h e Lessor and t h e terms and provisions of
this agreement t o b e kept and performed by
each party to the other, t h e Lessor does
hereby . . . lease unto t h e . . . , w h o does
hereby agree to accept as leased property and
premises and in accordance with t h e terms and
provisions of t h e agreement, t h e following
described office space and premises . . .
To have t o hold said premises and office
space under t h e terms of this agreement for a
term of t e n (10) years
Trial Exhibit 4, p . 1 (emphasis a d d e d ) .
The p a r t i e s 7 mutual promises entered into upon the execution of t h e Lease Agreement clearly constitute sufficient consideration

for t h e agreement.

However,

even

:li f Eng] i si „ had

denied Standard possession of t h e p r e m i s e s , that conduct does not
deprive

*.:

Lease

a 11 o
may

Agreement

previously

'
constitute

-<
breach

,t T ;..
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:eas>

<

exchanged
- ess i o"

?r perhaps

considerJl

S t" a 111J a i i i

trespass,

neither of which Standard has raised in its Petition for Rehearing as an issue.

However, one party's breach of a contract does

not automatically render the contract unenforceable.

Moreover, a

tortious act by one party to a contract generally does not constitute a defense to another party's action on the contract.
Centric Corp. v. Drake Building Corp., 726 P.2d 1047, 1053-54
(Wyo. 1986).
In any event, English did not deprive Standard of possession of the leased premises.

Standard's failure to occupy the

premises after August 31, 1988, resulted from its own voluntarily
decision not to do so.

Record on Appeal "R." at 189, 191 (Find-

ings of Fact, f 4, 11).

A true and correct copy of the trial

court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached
hereto as Exhibit "A."

The trial court's Findings of Fact, which

are not challenged on appeal, establish that Standard understood
that it had the right to possess the premises.

On or about June

30, 1988, Steven Shubach proposed to "sublease" the leased premises after the expiration of the second three year period of the
lease term.

R. at 190 (Finding of Fact, 5 8). On July 5, 1988,

Dr. English requested that Standard submit a list of proposed

1

Findings of fact which are unchallenged on appeal are
verities and the appellate court is bound by those findings.
R.R. Gable Inc. v. Burrows, 649 P.2d 177, 180 (Wash. App. 1982)
cert, denied 103 S.Ct. 2429, 461 U.S. 957, 77 L.Ed.2d 1316.
-4-

tenants

f o r sublettinn

t a c t , „ II I 11 i

*

premises

mi i! nil I |

Findings

-8 , S t e vei i

Dr. E n g l i s h indicating h i s d e s i r e to " s u b l e t " t h e leased p r e m i s e s
ti i) s o m e o n e o t h e r

than a subsidiary of Standard o p t i c a l ,

191 (I indings of Fact,

c

i

Subsequently,

R. a t

on August 1, 1988,

Steven Shubach wrote another letter to Dr. English proposing *
pay

a

• nei: ta i n moi ltl ill ;; i ei it a 11 amoi n it

for

period of the lease term or , alternatively

proposing a "buyout"

of the lease

* J 6.)

,

-at 191 (Finding ~f F ac *

1988

'• -

amounts,

v

*• ;r , • and

Ena . .

Finding of Fact, ;

On September
:ii scussed

rental

Steven Shubach

later said that he would contact Weight Watchers as a potential
II

sublessee

, i t 1 92 (P i n 3 in j of Fact, f 11 8)

Not only do the Findings of Fact support the conclusion
that English and Standard understood that Standard had the right
to possess the premises as of September 1

1988, they also estab-

lish that, as of that same date, English had not even attempted
to enter the premi ses arid d i d not attempt to enter the premises
and have an access key made until English was of the understanding that Steven Shubach had instructed him to find a tenant for
t h e p r ° ™""»<::: ':::ic::: *71 ' i * !i" Hi'! 1" » e
amount.

.•

.

?l

]::: a r t i e s c o n t i i I u e d

b i n d i n g s of F a c t ,
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Though the record

establishes that English did not

deprive Standard of possession of the leased premises, the proper
focus in evaluating the issue of consideration is not whether the
parties performed under the Lease Agreement, but rather whether
the parties exchanged bargained for promises in the first place.
That was clearly done in this case.
II.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT STANDARD DID
NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 24, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
The trial court correctly declined to address Stan-

dard^ argument that there is no basis for finding Standard liable for damage or lack of repairs due to noncompliance with Rule
24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Rule

24(a)(9)

requires that appellate briefs contain an argument and that:
The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the Appellant with
respect to the issues presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts
of the record relied on.
Standard argues in its Petition

for Rehearing that

because it takes the position that there is a complete lack of
evidence on the issue of damages, it need not present the Court
with legal authorities or citations to the record.

Contrary to

Standard's position, a party can refer the court to testimony of
witnesses through whom the missing testimony may have come in so
that the court has the opportunity of reviewing the relevant

-6-

portions of the trial transcript to determine for itself whether
or not there is in fact such a complete lack of evidence.
More significantly, Standard has failed to identify for
the Court which of the trial courts rulings it challenges on the
2
issue of damages.

Because Standard did not challenge any of the

trial court's Findings of Fact, it appears that Standard contends
that the trial court erred in its Conclusion of Law, paragraph 3,
pertaining to Standard's liability for damages to the property.
However, Standard utterly fails to provide the Court with any
basis to overturn that or any other Conclusion of Law.
In its Petition for Rehearing, Standard boldly makes
the assertion, unsupported by any citation to the record, that
there was a lack of evidence to support the trial court's ruling
on damages.

In taking this position, Standard entirely ignores

four Findings of Fact which
appeal.

Standard has not challenged

on

In those Findings of Fact, the trial court found that

Standard had failed to maintain the premises in a clean and sanitary condition, R. at 196 (Findings of Fact, f 39) , that it had
removed attachments from the building, R. at 196 (Findings of
Fact, f 40), that it had failed to keep the furnace in a state of
2

Rule
Petitions
points of
overlooked

35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that
for Rehearing, "shall state with particularity the
law or fact which the petitioner claims the court has
or misapprehended."
-7-

reasonable repair, R. at 196 (Findings of Fact, f 41) , and that
Standard's acts resulted in a damaged ceiling and damaged walls,
carpets, trim and floor tiles.
42.)

R at 196-197 (Findings of Fact, 5

Because Standard did not challenge any of the findings, it

stands to reason that Standard cannot now challenge the Conclu3
sion of Law which is supported by those unchallenged findings.
Finally, Standard contends that there was no evidence
of the condition of the premises at the commencement of the
lease.

As discussed in English's Brief of Respondent, Standard's

position

entirely

overlooks the

language of the

lease which

unequivocally establishes that the premises were in "good" and/or
"excellent" repair at the beginning of the lease term.

When it

executed the lease in 1982, Standard agreed, in three different
places in the lease, to accept the premises in "good" and/or
"excellent" condition:
It is mutually understood and agreed
that the premises herein leased are in a condition of excellent repair. . .
Trial Exhibit 4, p. 2.
The lessee does hereby accept the Leased
Premises in a condition of good repair . . .

3

Where the findings of fact are not challenged on appeal, the
appellate court's review is generally limited to determining
whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.
Fuller v. Employment Security Department of State of Washington,
762 P.2d 367, 369 (Wash. App. 1988).
-8-

Trial Exhibit 4, p. 2.
The lessee does hereby agree to accept
the demised premises in a state of good
repair . . .
Trial Exhibit 4, p. 3.
In view of Standards express acknowledgment of the
good and/or excellent condition of the premises at the beginning
of the lease, the trial court had ample evidence on which to conclude that the damage found by English had resulted from Standard's occupancy of the premises.

Standard simply has not pre-

sented the Court with any basis to overrule the trial court's
findings.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Court of Appeals neither overlooked or misapprehended

Standard's

"consideration" and

"damages" arguments.

The trail court's Findings of Fact on both those issues are not
challenged on appeal and the Conclusions of Law were not erroneous as a matter of

law.

Accordingly,

English

respectfully

requests that the Court decline to put the parties and the Court
to additional time and expense in this matter and deny Standard's
Petition for Rehearing.

English further requests an Order grant-

ing him his reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in
responding to Standard's Petition for Rehearing.
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DATED this

z

day of August, 1991.

GARY E. CjOCTORMAN
ELIZABETH S. WHITNEY
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered,
four true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING to the following on this

'

day of August,

1991:
George A. Hunt
Kurt M. Frankenburg
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

DOCTORMAN
?Y: E. DOCTOi
iZABETH S. WHITNEY
of and for
^ARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent

ESW/080491A
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EXHIBIT "A"

GARY E. DOCTORMAN (0895)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 West Broadway, Suite 400
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

W. DANIEL ENGLISH,
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

STANDARD OPTICAL CO., a Utah
corporation,
Defendant.

)
)

Civil No. 89-0900580CN

)

Judge Michael R. Murphy

* * * * * * * *

This matter came for trial before the Honorable Judge
Michael R. Murphy on December 21, 1989 and continued into December

22, 1989.

Plaintiff,

W. Daniel

English

("Dr.

English")

appeared in person and through his attorney, Gary E. Doctorman of
Parsons, Behle & Latimer and defendant Standard Optical Company
("Standard

Optical")

appeared

through

its

president,

Stephen

Schubach and its general manager, Klaus Rathke, and through their
attorneys, George Hunt and Kurt Frankenberg of Snow, Christensen
& Martineau.

The court having heard the testimony of the wit-

nesses

by

called

the plaintiff,

Fred

Burns, Gordon

Helstrom,

Willard Helstrom, Dr. English and Nikkie Dore and the witnesses
called by the defendants, Stephen Schubach and Klaus Rathke, and
pursuant

to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court

makes the following findings of fact.
1.

On

August

10,

1982,

Dr.

English

and

Standard

Optical entered into a written Lease Agreement for the lease of
commercial

real property and a building located at 3525 Market

Street, West Valley City, Utah.
2.

The

significant

portions

of

the

signed

Lease in controversy are described below:
(a) To have and to hold said premises
and office space under the terms of this
agreement for a term of ten (10) years
beginning on the first day of the month
following written notice to lessee from
lessor and terminating at midnight on the
last day of the same month 10 years hence
[i.e. 1992].
(b) The Lessee does hereby unconditionally agree to pay as rent for the demised
premises and to lessor, or order, at West
Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah, the sum
of $1,000 each month for 36 months with the
first such installment to be due and payable
on or before the first day of September,
1982, and each installment payment to be due
thereafter on or before the same calendar day
during the term of the Agreement.
A grace
period of five days is given for the making
of such installment payment.
(c) The monthly rent specified in the
section above shall be negotiated every 36
months.
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written

(d) It
is mutually
understood
and
agreed by these parties that the demised
premises herein will be used by the lessee as
a retail optical business and lessee does
hereby agree to use said premises for no
other purpose without the written consent of
lessor first had and obtained. However, such
consent will not be unreasonably withheld.
(e) It
is mutually
understood
and
agreed that the premises herein leased are in
a condition of excellent repair . . . .
(f) The Lessee does hereby agree to at
all times during the term of this agreement
keep the heating and air conditioning units
in a condition of good repair.
(g) The
Lessee
hereby
accepts
the
leased premises in a condition of good repair
and does hereby agree to at all times during
the term of this agreement to maintain the
interior of the demised premises and to keep
the same in a condition of good repair at all
times, and agrees not to make any alterations
to the demised premises without the written
consent of the lessor first had and obtained,
and then that all such alterations shall be
made at the sole expense of the Lessee and
that any such alterations as are then made a
part of or attached to the building shall
remain with the premises and become the
property of the lessor at the end of this
lease term.
(h) The Lessee does likewise agree to
provide suitable floor covering
(carpet,
tile, etc) of his choice in said premises, to
be responsible for all repairs done or needed
to be done to the interior of the demised
premises during the term of this agreement.
(i) The Lessee does hereby agree to be
responsible for all breakage to windows and
doors in the demised premises and not to
install any signs on the demised premises
without the permissions of the Lessor.
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(j) The Lessee shall not sublet any
portion of the leased premises without the
written consent of lessors first had and
obtained.
Nor shall the Lessee assign this
lease in whole or in part without the written
consent of the Lessors. . . .
(k) It is agreed that the Lessor will
not be liable to the lessee on account of any
damage to any property of the Lessee in the
demised premises on the count of lack of
repairs to any equipment in the demised
premises as is the responsibility of the
Lessee to repair and maintain, and that the
Lessor shall have the right to any reasonable
inspection of the demised premises at any
reasonable time during the term of this
agreement.
The Lessee does hereby agree to
at all times keep the interior of the demised
premises in a clean and sanitary condition in
accordance with all good and reasonable
standards of like commercial units.
(1) It is mutually agreed that in the
event of the failure, neglect or default of
the Lessee to make payments herein provided,
as they become due, or within the grace
period, that the Lessor shall have the right
and option to proceed under the terms of the
following provisions or either of them:
(m) To declare this agreement terminated and proceed, with or without legal
process to take possession of the demised
premises and in which event this agreement
will be terminated and each of the parties
will be excused from any further performance
of the terms and provisions herein set forth,
or
(n) To take any action necessary to
evict the Lessee from the demised premises,
and to proceed to make any and all necessary
repairs to the property and to proceed to
rent the same to any other person, and in the
event it is necessary for Lessor to take a
reduction of the rental rate on said demised

-4-

premises that the Lessee will pay the Lessor
all
expenses,
in
connection
with
such
repairs, re-renting and any loss of rentals
as may be determined by the rates set forth
herein.
In this respect it is agreed that
time is of the essence of this agreement and
that the terms and provisions herein set
forth will extend to and become binding upon
the respective heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of these parties, and that
the Lessee shall have no right to make any
assignment of any rights under the terms of
this agreement.
(o) The Lessee does hereby agree to
turn said premises back to the Lessor at the
end of this lease term in as good a condition
as the premises are at the commencement of
this lease, with only ordinary wear and
depreciation being accepted.
(p) It is mutually agreed that in the
event it becomes necessary for either party
to enforce the terms of this agreement with
court action, after default, that the party
determined to be in default will pay to the
opposite party all court costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees.
3.
defendant

On

entered

or

about

September

into a written

1,

1985,

addendum

plaintiff

and

to the 1982 Rental

Agreement specifying a monthly rent of $1,200 to be paid for the
36-month period beginning on September 1, 1985.
4,

In

1986

and

1987,

Standard

Optical

made

the

decision to convert their optical stores to "super stores" where
possible

and

in early 1988 began negotiations with the Valley

Fair Mall, one block away from the leased premises, and in June,
1988, executed a lease with Valley Fair Mall for a super store.

-5-

5.
experienced

Prior

to

September,

1988, plaintiff

had

never

any problems with Standard Optical promptly paying

rent.
6.

Prior

to June

1988, Standard

Optical

understood

the Rental Agreement term to expire at the end of August 1988,
with an option to negotiate a renewal.
7.
Standard

On June 20, 1988, Klaus Rathke, General Manager of

Optical

("Rathke")

told

Dr.

English

Optical was moving to the Valley Fair Mall.
Mr. Rathke that

the Lease

that

Standard

Dr. English informed

term did not expire

in 1988.

Mr.

Rathke expressed he thought the lease term was up and Dr„ English
referred him to the Lease.
8.

On or about June 30, 1988, Dr. English and Steven

Schubach ("Schubach") discussed the leased premises and Schubach
proposed to sublease the premises.
he would consider

a proposal

Dr. English wrote back that

and responded

in writing

as the

Lease agreement required to,consent of the Landlord.
9.

On July 1, 1988, Standard Optical promptly paid

its July rent to Dr. English.
10.

On

July

5,

1988, Dr.

English

requested

that

Standard Optical submit a list of proposed tenants for subletting
the premises and suggested a meeting
negotiate a new rental amount.

*.fi-

on September

15, 1988 to

11.

July 17, 1988, was Standard Optical's last day of

business at the leased premises.
12.

On or about July 18, 1988, Standard Optical moved

its records and inventory from the leased premises and also moved
attachments to the building and built-in-cabinets and counters.
Several large signs were placed on the premises stating Standard
Optical

had moved.

Dr. English

read

the signs

and

concluded

Standard Optical had moved.
13.

On July 20, 1988, Schubach wrote to Dr. English

stating that Standard Optical had abandoned their plans to have a
subsidiary of Standard Optical sublet

the space but wanted to

sublet it to someone else.
14.

On July 22, 1988, Dr. English wrote to Schubach

stating that he needed to know more about the proposed subtenant
before he could approve a subtenant.
15.

On August 1, 1988, Standard Optical promptly paid

its rent for the month of August.
16.
English
for

Also on August 1, 1988, Mr. Schubach wrote to Dr.

indicating

that Standard Optical

an $800 per month

Lease beginning

intended

September

to negotiate
1, 1988, and

alternatively proposing a buy-out of $4,800 to be paid on September 15, 1988.
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17.
English

met

On September
to

discuss

26, 1988, Schubach, Rathke and Dr.

the

lease.

Dr. English

document with rent comparables to Schubach.
the rent comparables.
and Layton stores.
sublease

that

presented

a

Schubach rejected

Schubach commented about rent in his Provo

Dr. English suggested if Standard wanted to

they

should

consider

calling

Weight

Watchers.

Schubach stated "We're not in the leasing business, you are.

Our

business is the optical business."
18.

Schubach later said he would contact Rick Trentman

of Weight Watchers.
meeting

with

the

Dr. English left the September

understanding

that

Standard

Optical

26, 1988,
was not

going to use the premises as a retail optical shop and that Dr.
English, who was in the leasing business, should find a tenant
and the parties would continue to negotiate the Lease amount.
19.
understanding

On

September

that

he

was

29,
to

1988,
attempt

in compliance
to

find

a

with

his

tenant,

Dr.

English had an access key made for the premises and upon entering
the premises to inspect it he found damage to the Premises.
20.

On October 1, 1988, Standard Optical did not pay

21.

On October 5, 1988, Dr. English sent a notice of

any rent.

default
same

to Standard

Lease

amount

Optical
until

and suggested

they

agreed
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and

the parties use the
that

they

use

MAI

appraisers to determine the amount.

Dr. English did this because

he believed Schubach had used Standard Optical's Provo and Layton
stores

as

comparisons

which

Dr.

English

believed

to

be

inappropriate.
22.

No subtenant was ever presented to Dr. English by

Standard Optical.

Further, Stephen Schubach called and left a

message for Rick Trentman but never made contact directly with
Rick Trentman of Weight Watchers.
23.

On October 18, 1988, Dr. English changed the lock

to the premises for the purpose of protecting the tools of the
repairmen who would be working on the premises.
24.

On October

20, 1988, Standard Optical

check in the amount of $1600:
October

rent.

issued a

$800 for September and $800 for

Schubach sent this amount because

Standard Optical left the negotiations.

it was where

No mention was made that

it was in response to a Demand Letter.
25.

On October 20, 1988, Dr. English's attorney, Gary

Doctorman, wrote

a letter

Standard Optical Company.

to Richard

and Stephen Schubach

at

The letter informed Standard Optical

that it was "in violation of the terms of the lease" and that if
it desired to "remain in possession of the leased premises," it
should

make

rent

payments

for

-9-

the

months

of

September

and

October.

The amount of rent claimed due was not specified in the

letter.
26.

Dr. English subsequently returned the $1,600 check

to Standard Optical because the parties had not yet arrived at an
agreed amount.
27.

On November 1, 1988, no payment was made.

28.

In

the

first

week

of

November,

1988,

Schubach

called Dr. English at his home and agreed that Standard Optical
would pay $1,000 monthly rent.
29.

Each time Standard Optical sought

access to the

property after the locks were changed, access was achieved.
30.

On or about November 7, 1988, Dr. English's office

gave the key to the premises to an employee of Standard Optical.
31.
Optical

On or about November 5 and November

employees

entered

into

the

Premises

and

7, Standard
removed

the

remaining Standard Optical possessions.
32.

Between September

1, 1988 and January

31, 1989,

Standard Optical only attempted to enter the premises on November
5, 1988 or November 7, 1988, and during the first half of October, 1988, on November 4, 1988 and on December 16, 1988.
time
mises

that Standard Optical attempted
were

they

denied

access.

to enter the Leased Pre-

Dr. English's

actions

deprived Standard Optical of access to the premises.
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At no

never

33.

Sometime

before November

between

the

last

10, 1988, subcontractors

commenced repairs to the Premises.

week

of

October

and

hired by Dr. English

At that time Dr. English had

not yet arranged for any particular tenant to lease the Premises.
34.

On November 21, 1988, Dr. English received $1,600

in payment, the check markings indicated $1,000 of which was to
be applied

to the September

rent and $600 to be applied to a

partial payment for the October rent.
35.

On November 21, 1988, Standard Optical paid Utah

Power & Light for electricity supplied to the premises at 3525
Market Street up through October 18, 1988.
36.

On December

1, 1988, Standard Optical

issued a

check to Dr. English in the amount of $1,000.
37.
letter

to

Mr.

On December
Rathke

at

2, 1988, Dr. English sent
Standard

Optical

a demand

requesting

payments due for October, November and December."

"lease

In his letter,

Dr. English also indicated .that he had three prospective tenants
for the premises.

On December 5, 1988, Dr. English received a

check from Standard Optical in the amount of $1,000.
38.

On December

6, 1988, Standard Optical paid Utah

Power & Light for electricity supplied to the premises at 3525
Market Street through November 18, 1988.
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39.
premises

at

Defendant Standard Optical failed to maintain the
all

times

in

a clean

and

sanitary

condition

in

accordance with good and reasonable standards of like commercial
units.
40.

Defendant

Standard

Optical

removed

Standard

Optical

failed

attachments

from the building.
41.

Defendant

to

keep

the

furnace in a reasonable state of repair.
42.

Dr.

English

and

contractors1

his

inspection

revealed the reasonable need to repair and Dr. English did repair
at a reasonable cost as indicated as follows:
(a)

The furnace was not working properly and plumbing

was damaged and Willard Hellstrom charged $619.86 for repairs.
(b)

It

appeared

that

Standard

Optical

had

removed

numerous fixtures, including built-in-cabinets and counters.

The

removal

the

left

large and small holes

ceiling, walls, and carpets.
cabinets
failed

left
to

fix

gaps
a

in the

plumbing

in the walls, damaged

Also, the removal of the built-in
trim.
leak

Additionally,
damaging

the

cabinets and left the floor tiles curling.

Standard

bathroom

had

walls,

The damage to the

walls, ceiling, bathroom trim was repaired with like materials.
The

bills

for

repairs

were:
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Gordon

Hellstrom,

$2,031.82;

Butterfield

Lumber,

$366.42; Fred

Burns,

$4,143.30;

Perschon,

$113.99 and Perschon $1,472.01.
(c)
tures

Standard

requiring

Optical

repair

of

34

left behind damaged
landholders,

light

replacement

of

fix120

lamps and other repairs by Willard Hellstrom totalling $1,135.26.
(d)

The

above

repairs

totalled

$9,852.66

and

Dr.

English substantially paid these amounts on or before December
31, 1988.
43.

Dr. English mitigated

his damages

and

re-rented

the premises for a period of one year to Weight Watchers, Inc. at
a sum of $990.00 per month commencing the 1st day of July, 1989.
44.

Standard Optical refused to pay rent of $1,400 for

the rent due in 1988 and has paid no rent in the year 1989.
45.

Reasonable

attorneys'

fees

of

$11,968.40

were

incurred by plaintiff, and plaintiff's expenses and filing fees
of $75.00f service of process fees of $9.75 and deposition costs
of $453.45.
THE COURT HAVING MADE THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF FACT hereby
enters its Conclusions of Law:
1.

Pursuant

to the terms of the written Lease, the

parties negotiated at the end of the second 36-month term and on
or about November 2, 1988 the parties agreed that the rent for
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the next 36-month term from September 1, 1988 to August 1, 1991
would be $1,000 per month.
2.

Standard Optical failed to pay the rent as agreed

and breached the written Lease.

Dr. English has been damaged in

the amount of lost rent for the year 1988 in the amount of $1,400
and for lost rent from January 1, 1989 through the 1st day of
July, 1990 in the amount of $6,000.

Plaintiff is entitled to the

entry of judgment of these amounts.
3.
Agreement
repair

Standard

between

the

Optical

the parties

premises,

including

breached
as they
the

the

failed

furnace,

written

Lease

to maintain
and

they

and

removed

attachments to the building and as a result of their failure to
maintain and repair, Dr. English reasonably repaired the premises
at a reasonable cost of $9,852.66.
4.

Dr. English incurred reasonable attorneys' fees in

the amount of $11,968.40 and is entitled to a judgment for that
amount.
5.

Dr. English is entitled to prejudgment interest on

the damages and lost rent at the rate of 10%•
6.

Dr. English incurred court costs in the amount of

$538.20 and is entitled to a judgment for that amount.
7.

Interest shall accrue on the judgment at the rate

of 12% from the date of the judgment.
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8.

Plaintiffs failed to meet its burden of proof to

show defendants failed to negotiate in good faith.
9.

Pursuant

to

the decision

in Reid

v. Mutual

of

Omaha Insurance Company, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (1989), this court
will impose damage awards based on past events only and does not
take into account the landlord's mitigation efforts in the future
and therefore this court retains jurisdiction of this matter and
awards only those rents that have come due as of the time of the
trial, which judgment will be immediately enforceable.
and damages

accruing

The rents

after the trial may be recovered

through

supplemental proceedings for any further rents lost or damages
incurred
ongoing

imposing
duty

the duty

to mitigate.

upon
The

the

landlord

initial

to

fulfill

determination

of

its
the

tenant's liability would govern in the supplemental proceeding.
DATED this

f

day of vi>/M/jjfAU

T

[IAU^X

. 19_£?.

if

JUDGE MICHAEL R. MURP:
Approved as to form:

George A. Hunt
Attorney for Defendant
Standard Optical Company
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing

FINDINGS OF

FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to George A. Hunt, Snow, Christensen &
Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 on this

<^f

day of January, 199oY^
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